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Exporters and multinationals are larger and more productive than their domestic 
counterparts. In addition to productivity, financial constraints and labor market 
constraints might constitute barriers to entry into foreign markets. We present new 
empirical evidence on the extensive and intensive margin of exports and FDI based on 
detailed micro-level data of German firms. Our paper has three main findings. First, in 
line with earlier literature, we find a positive impact of firm size and productivity on 
firms’ international activities. Second, small firms suffer more frequently from 
financial constraints than bigger firms, but financial conditions have no strong effect 
on internationalization. Third, labor market constraints constitute a more severe 
barrier to foreign activities than financial constraints. Being covered by collective 
bargaining particularly impedes international activities.  
Keywords:  foreign direct investment, exports, firm heterogeneity, productivity, 
financial constraints, labor market constraints 
JEL-classification: F2,  G2 
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1 Motivation 
The recent global financial and economic crisis has been accompanied by an unprece-
dented decline in international trade volumes (Freund 2009). Apart from the slump in 
global demand, restricted access to trade finance could be one reason for this decline. 
The associated tightening of financial market conditions may also have a negative 
feedback effect on the activities of multinational firms (UNCTAD 2008). While it is 
too early to assess the impact of the financial crisis, this paper adds to a growing 
literature stressing the importance of financial constraints for international activities 
of firms. Moreover, we analyze the importance of labor market constraints. We use a 
detailed firm-level dataset for Germany, which provides information on firms’ 
international activities, access to external capital, size, productivity, labor market 
constraints, and their R&D activity. Our results confirm earlier studies that find an 
important effect of firm size and productivity on foreign activities. The impact of 
financial constraints is weak, but labor market constraints matter in particular for the 
extensive margin of foreign activities. 
From a theoretical point of view, the impact of firm-level characteristics on exports 
and FDI is motivated by the observation that highly productive firms self-select into 
exporting (Melitz 2003, Helpman et al. 2004). The key to the Melitz model is that, ex 
ante, firms do not know their productivity. Upon entry, firms draw their productivity 
level from a commonly known productivity distribution. Depending on the level of 
productivity, they exit the market, they produce only for the domestic market, or they 
become exporters. The implicit assumption in these models is that financial markets 
are fully developed and that firms can either finance foreign operations internally 
and/or without incurring an external finance premium.    3
Recently, the role of financial constraints on the international activity of heterogene-
ous firms has been addressed in theoretical models that stand in the tradition of Melitz 
(2003). Chaney (2005) or Berman and Hericourt (2008) find that more productive 
firms that generate large amounts of liquidity from their domestic sales and wealthier 
firms that inherit a high amount of liquidity are more likely to export. In Manova 
(2008), credit constraints reinforce the negative impact of low productivity for entry 
into foreign markets (extensive margin) and for the volume of exports (intensive 
margin). Buch et al. (2009) simultaneously analyze the impact of financial constraints 
on export and FDI decisions of firms. The model shows that firms are more likely to 
engage in FDI the higher their productivity and the weaker financial constraints. Also, 
financial constraints increase the productivity cut-off required for entry into foreign 
markets. 
The insight that entry into foreign markets is affected not only by the productivity of 
firms but also by financial constraints has also spawned a small but growing empirical 
literature. A few papers show that tighter financial constraints have a negative impact 
on exports. Bellone et al. (2008) use French data, Du and Girma (2007) use data for 
for Chinese firms, and Berman and Hericourt (2008) use a cross-country dataset. 
Using country-level data, Manova (2008) shows that financially developed countries 
are more likely to export bilaterally and to ship greater volumes. For British firms, 
Greenaway et al. (2007) find the reverse causality: Exporting improves a firm’s 
financial health, but financially healthy firms are not more likely to become exporters. 
Stiebale (2008) supports this using French data.    4
In this paper, we use a detailed firm-level survey of German firms, the IAB Estab-
lishment Panel (IAB Betriebspanel).
1 The original purpose of this survey is to deliver 
high-quality data for the analysis of the labor market.
2 In recent years, firms have 
additionally been asked about their international activities and their financial con-
straints. Our data allow going beyond the existing literature in three ways. 
First, we analyze exports and foreign investment activities, and we measure financial 
constraints using accounting information (cash flow) and self-reported financial 
constraints. We find that self-reported financial constraints do not affect exports or 
FDI. Cash flow has an impact on the volume of exports and a weak effect on selection 
into FDI.  
Second, our findings suggest that labor market constraints might constitute more 
important barriers to foreign activities than financial constraints. Being covered by a 
collective bargaining scheme lowers the probability of exporting or FDI. Domestic 
shortages in terms of qualified personnel increase these probabilities. Wage cost 
problems lower the volume of exports. In general, labor market constraints seem to 
affect the extensive margin of international activities more than the intensive margin.  
Third, we consistently measure these constraints as well as other factors that may 
affect the propensity of firms to engage internationally such as productivity or R&D 
activity at the firm-level. In line with the existing literature, we find that larger and 
                                                  
1  Data access (during research visits and by controlled remote data processing) was granted by the 
Center for Research Data of the Institute for Employment Research at the Federal Employment 
Agency in Nuremberg. 
2  Throughout the paper, we use the term ‚firm’ to denote the unit of observation in the empirical 
model, i.e. the individual plant. In 2006, 88% of the observed plants were independent firms.   5
more productive firms as well as firms active in R&D are more likely to export and to 
engage in FDI than smaller and less productive firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop our main 
hypotheses. In section 3, we present descriptive statistics. Section 4 introduces our 
econometric approach and presents the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
2 Hypotheses 
The aim of this paper is to show the importance of productivity, financial constraints, 
and labor market constraints as barriers to entry into foreign markets. Recent theoreti-
cal work analyzes the impact of financial constraints on export activities (Berman and 
Hericourt 2008, Chaney 2005, Manova 2008). Buch et al. (2009) also analyze the 
implications for FDI decisions. One feature of these models is that firms can choose 
between being active on the domestic or on the foreign market. To serve the foreign 
market, the firm has to incur a fixed cost that depends on the mode of entry. The fixed 
costs of FDI are higher than the fixed costs of exports since additional overhead 
functions must be maintained abroad. In addition to choosing whether to produce 
abroad (the extensive margin), the firm also has to decide how large a capacity to set 
up for production (the intensive margin). The firm faces a cash-in-advance constraint 
as the set up costs have to be paid before production is taken up and before revenues 
are generated.  
Despite differences in the modelling strategies, these models yield the following 
hypothesis concerning the impact of productivity and financial constraints on the 
export and FDI decisions of firms (see, e.g. Buch et al. 2009). 
Hypothesis 1: The probability of setting-up an affiliate abroad (or to export) depends 
positively on the productivity of the project, on the size of the foreign market, on the   6
volume of internal funds (and thus weaker financial constraints), and on the tangibil-
ity of a firm’s assets (and thus its ability to pledge collateral). Similar parameters 
affect the intensive margin of firms’ foreign activities and thus the volume of FDI or 
exports.  
When applying the insights of the models sketched above to our analysis of German 
firms’ internationalization decisions, it is important to note that we have no informa-
tion about the host markets in which firms invest. Therefore, our analysis is confined 
to variables that can be measured at the level of the (German) company. 
In our empirical model, financial constraints are firm-specific. From a theoretical 
point of view, firms may, for instance, differ with regard to the relative importance of 
soft and hard information (Petersen 2004) and thus the ability of banks to assess the 
quality of their business plan and of their management. They may also differ with 
regard to the intensity of lending relationships, the tangibility of assets and thus the 
degree of collateralizable assets, or the ability of the management. Finally, the 
customer structure of firms and thus the riskiness of their revenues might differ. 
Hence, even within the same industry, financial constraints differ significantly 
between firms, and these differences can be expected to reflect more than differences 
in firms’ productivities.  
In addition to financial constraints stressed by the models, firms may also differ with 
regard to the labor market constraints they are facing, which in turn, may affect their 
international activities. Our dataset provides information on labor market conditions 
faced by the firms in terms of personnel shortages, problems with worker protection 
laws, the share of unskilled employees, the presence of a works council, and coverage 
by a collective bargaining system. Generally, these variables should affect the 
internationalization decision in the following way.   7
Hypothesis 2:  The probability of setting-up an affiliate abroad (or to export) in-
creases if labor market constraints increase the fixed costs of operating at home 
relative to the fixed costs of operating abroad or the productivity of domestic workers. 
This probability depends negatively on the variable costs of domestic production. In a 
similar way, labor market constraints affect the intensive margin of firms’ foreign 
activities and thus the volume of FDI or exports.  
Hence, the effects of labor market constraints on exports and FDI are less straightfor-
ward than the effects of financial constraints, and their sign may even be ambiguous. 
To give an example, being covered by a collective bargaining scheme could have a 
positive or a negative impact on foreign activities. On the one hand, collective 
bargaining may reduce the flexibility of a firm, which could result in a lower produc-
tivity. Collective bargaining may increase the bargaining power of workers and thus 
lead to higher wages. This, in turn, makes production at home relatively unattractive. 
On the other hand, search and contracting costs may be lower compared to firms 
without collective bargaining schemes, thus lowering the fixed costs of domestic 
production. Ultimately, it is thus an empirical question which of the effects dominates. 
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The theoretical hypotheses derived above will be tested using representative micro-
level panel data of 16,000 German establishments.
3  
                                                  
3  Table A1 in the appendix provides an overview of the data as well as of the various measurement 
issues discussed in the following.   8
3.1 International Activity 
Approximately 10% of all firms serve foreign markets via exporting. Hence, most 
firms in our sample are active only domestically. With regard to FDI, the data allow to 
identify whether firms have invested into FDI objects in the years 2004 and/or 2005. 
Hence, we measure FDI flows into new or already existing foreign investment 
objects. Only about 0.5% of all firms have invested into foreign affiliates. Considering 
that our data include also the smallest firms (with at least one employee
 covered by 
the social insurance system), this seems to be a reasonable number. 
3.2  Financial Constraints  
Measuring financial constraints is not a trivial task since balance-sheet information 
might be affected by accounting standards and self-reported financial constraints 
might contain subjective information. (See Greenaway et al. (2007) for a detailed 
discussion of different approaches.) Some authors also use financial indicators (see, 
e.g., Bellone 2008), but these indices typically also include variables that are related 
to the productivity of firms. 
Our data have the advantage that they include both, self-reported financial constraints 
as well as accounting information. For the year 2005, firms that have realized 
investments of any kind had to report whether or not they have faced problems raising 
external finance and whether these difficulties have had negative implications for their 
investment activities. Of course, one objection against such self-reported financial 
constraints is that firms might always be interested in increasing their leverage; hence 
the responses might be biased. We try to accommodate this concern by including 
other variables that might affect firms’ access to external capital such as their 
productivity and R&D potential. Hence, the self-reported financial constraints 
measure the partial influence conditional on other, observable covariates.    9
Overall, 8% of all firms that have invested in 2004 self-report financial constraints.
4 
Table 1a also shows that the presence of financial constraints is declining in the size 
of firms. Whereas 10% of all firms with 1-4 employees report financial constraints, 
only 4% of those with more than 500 employees do so. Furthermore, Table  1a 
suggests a non-linear relation between firm size and the relative frequency of self-
reported financial constraints. This is consistent with theories stressing asymmetric 
information problems particularly for small firms. 
Table 1b also shows heterogeneity across industries. The share of credit-constrained 
firms is lower in the service sector than in manufacturing or transportation. This 
reflects the fact that production in the latter industries is more capital-intensive and 
hence requires higher financial funds. Another reason may be that industries with a 
large share of firm-specific capital used in the production process and low inventories 
of intermediate and final goods may have difficulties to pledge collateral.  
As a further control variable, we measure the firms’ dependence on external capital by 
the share of investment that is financed by cash flow.
 We include this variable since 
the cash flow sensitivity of investment has often been used as a measure of the 
financial constraints that firms are facing. Following this interpretation, a positive 
impact of cash flow on investment would be an indication that firms are financially 
constrained. However, this interpretation has been criticized (George et al. 2008), 
hence the expected sign on cash flow is not clear cut a priori.  
3.3  Exposure to Labor Market Constraints 
The IAB Establishment Panel provides detailed information on employment condi-
tions and labor market constraints. We use firm-level information on the importance 
                                                  
4  The question that was posed in 2005 was with regard to the year 2004.   10
of shortages of qualified personnel, wage cost problems, problems regarding worker 
protection laws, the existence of a works council, and firms’ coverage by collective of 
firm-specific bargaining agreements.  
Table A2 shows that 39% of all firms are subject to industry-wide collective bargain-
ing agreements. Nearly one third of the firms (31%) expect problems because of high 
labor costs in the following two years. Every sixth firm has a works council (16%) 
and every fifth firm expects personnel shortages (19%). Worker protection laws are an 
issue for only 5% of the firms. Note that worker protection laws, for instance, apply to 
all firms in a given size group. However, whether these laws are binding or not 
depends on the presence of a works council and the degree of self organization of the 
workforce.  
While financial constraints are more important for smaller firms than for larger firms, 
reported labor market problems increase continuously in firm size. For example, 64% 
of firms with more than 500 employees report to suffer from high labor costs. Every 
second firm in this size group reports personnel shortages. Problems regarding worker 
protection laws differ widely across firms. They are hardly relevant for the very small 
firms (as only 1-6% of the firms with up to 20 employees report problems) but they 
are important for one third of the large firms (500+ employees). The importance of 
firm-specific collective bargaining agreements varies less across firms, with only 1-
3% of the very small and 11% of the very large firms being affected. 
The link between firm size and the severity of labor market constraints is non-linear. 
Many labor market regulations do not apply to small firms, such as the possibility to 
maintain works councils (which applies only to firms with at least 5 employees) or 
firing constraints (which apply only to firms with more than 10 employees).    11
3.4  Productivity and Technology 
The key variable determining entry into foreign markets stressed in theory is a firm’s 
productivity. Ideally, we would compute a measure of total factor productivity. 
Lacking information on the capital stock, we measure productivity using sales per 
employee and value added per employee.
5  
For the years 2003 and 2005, firms also provide information on their level of technol-
ogy. Technology is measured on an ordinal scale from 1 (best) to 5 (worst). Since 
firms using more modern and efficient technologies are more productive, we expect a 
negative impact of this variable on the decision to engage in international activities. 
Also, including a direct measure of R&D activity addresses the point made by Aw, 
Roberts, and Xu (2009) that productivity and exporting might be driven simultane-
ously by the R&D intensity of firms.  
3.5  Are Exporters and Multinationals Special? 
The evidence presented above reveals the heterogeneity of German firms with respect 
to financial and labor market constraints as well as with respect to the level of 
productivity and technology. Financial constraints are more common among smaller 
firms, while adverse labor market conditions prevail particularly among larger firms. 
Next, we analyze whether these features are also related to firms’ international 
activities. 
As regards export status, financially constrained firms differ significantly from 
unconstrained firms (Table 2a). Financially unconstrained firms are slightly more 
often exporters than financially constrained firms, whereas their mean export volume 
                                                  
5  We correct for the importance of part-time workers by using full-time equivalents, and we calculate 
value added as sales minus intermediate inputs.   12
is considerably higher. Unconstrained firms are also larger on average (measured by 
the number of employees) and have higher sales. But financial constraints do not 
matter much for the volume of exports or FDI. There are no observable differences in 
the export-to-sales ratio across the two groups. And the share of firms that engage in 
FDI is even lower for unconstrained firms, which contrasts with the higher share of 
exporting firms in that group.  
In Table 2b, similar comparisons are made for labor market constraints. The share of 
exporting firms, the mean export volume, and the export-to-sales ratio are signifi-
cantly higher among the firms subject to labor market constraints like wage cost 
problems, personnel shortages, problems regarding worker protection laws, and works 
councils. Likewise, the share of firms that engage in FDI is higher among firms facing 
labor market constraints. Coverage by collective bargaining agreements is an excep-
tion. Firms covered by such agreements are less often exporters, have a lower export-
to-sales ratio, and do less often invest abroad. 
4 Regression  Analysis 
Next, we analyze the impact of firm size, productivity, firm-specific capital and labor 
market constraints on a firm’s decision to engage in international markets. We analyze 
both, the decision of firms to export (Table 3) and to invest abroad (Table 4), and we 
analyze the extensive margin (the selection into export and FDI status) as well as the 
intensive margin (the volume of activities). 
4.1 Model  Specification 
We estimate a two-step Heckman selection model, which allows analyzing the 
extensive and intensive margin of firm-level exports (or FDI) simultaneously. In order 
to check the robustness of our results, we have specified the extensive and the   13
intensive margins separately by running probit and OLS regressions, respectively. 
Since the qualitative results are identical, we do not report them. Our baseline 
selection equation is the following: 
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with Pr( 0) > i X  being the probability to export in 2005 or to invest abroad in 
2004/2005 of firm i.  
Our corresponding equation for estimating the volume of exports (or FDI) is: 
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with  i X  being the volume of exports in 2005 or FDI in 2004/2005. 
α j (β j ) are industry-specific fixed effects (j=1,...,41).  1 α ( 1 β ),  2 α ( 2 β ), and  6 β  are 
scalar coefficients,  3,4,5,6 α  as well as  3,4,5 β  are column vectors of regression coeffi-
cients. εi  and μi are the error terms. 
In order to address simultaneity issues we use lagged values in order to measure the 
firms’ characteristics prior to the internationalization decision in the year 2005 (for 
exports) or 2004 and/or 2005 (for FDI). 
We arrange our explanatory variables into four groups. A first group of variables 
includes measures for productivity and firm size. One-period lagged productivity is 
measured as  ,1 log( / )i YL−  which gives the natural logarithm of labor productivity 
before the international activity takes place. The expected sign of the coefficient is 
positive. The same holds for log employment ( ,1 log i L − ) as our measure for firm size.  
A second group of variables, stacked in the column vector  ,1 −
K
i d , captures financial 
constraints. We measure these using self-reported constraints regarding the access to 
the capital market and a cash flow variable. We expect a negative sign of the esti-  14
mated coefficient for the self-reported constraints. Finding a positive sign on the cash 
flow variable could be taken as an indication that firms are financially constrained. 
A third group of variables in the column vector  ,1 −
L
i d  addresses labor market con-
straints. It includes several dummy variables indicating whether a firm reports 
different labor market constraints. Additionally, we include the share of unskilled 
employees. The signs of the labor market related variables are not clear a priori, as 
laid out in section 2, and depend on the impact of these constraints on the fixed and 
variable costs of domestic operations and on the productivity of firms.  
A fourth group of variables, collected in the column vector  ,1 − i C  includes lagged 
control variables. We control for firm-level R&D activity and expect a positive 
impact. Firm age is used as a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm was 
founded before 1990. We include a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm 
is not part of a group. In the export equation, we include an FDI dummy; in the FDI 
equation, we include information on the export intensity of a given firm. The vector of 
control variables also includes a set of industry dummies.  
In order to identify the selection equation of the Heckman model, we include several 
exclusion variables ( i excl ). The first one is a dummy variable indicating whether the 
firm is located in Eastern Germany. In general, East Germany is less integrated 
internationally in terms of trade and FDI than West Germany. We also include 
dummy variables for innovation activity, problems regarding innovation, and a 
variable measuring the level of technology used in the firm. The expectation is that 
the less innovative firms have a lower productivity and are thus less likely to enter 
foreign markets.  i mills   is the Mills’ ratio.   15
4.2 The Extensive and Intensive Margin of Exports 
Our results show that selection into exporting (i.e. the extensive margin) affects the 
firm’s choice of the volume of exports (i.e. the intensive margin) (Table 3). The Mills’ 
ratio is positive and significant. Consistent with expectations, the dummy variable 
indicating firm location in Eastern Germany has a significantly negative impact on the 
probability to be an exporter. Innovative activity has a positive impact. 
Consistent with the Melitz-model and previous empirical evidence, selection into 
exporting and the volume of exports are positively related to size and productivity. 
The dummy variable for R&D activity affects both, the export volume and the 
selection into exporting, in a highly significant and positive way. The positive 
coefficient on the age dummy would be consistent with the interpretation that older 
(and presumably more productive) firms are more likely to export. 
The self-reported measure of financial constraints does not affect the selection into 
exporting or export volumes. The share of cash flow used in financing investments 
has a positive and significant impact on firms’ expansions along the intensive margin. 
This result would be consistent with literature interpreting the sensitivity of invest-
ment as a measure of the presence of financial constraints. 
Regarding labor market constraints, we find the most consistent result for collective 
bargaining agreements. Being covered by a collective bargaining agreement signifi-
cantly lowers the probability of exporting. Following our above interpretation, this 
would imply that collective bargaining lowers firms’ productivities and thus their 
ability to expand abroad. High wage costs have a negative impact on the volume of 
exports because they negatively affect the price competitiveness of firms in foreign 
markets. Problems with personnel shortages, in contrast, increase the probability of 
firms to be exporters. The interpretation of this effect is that these shortages refer to   16
qualified personnel, which could be an indication of high demand from export 
markets. The presence of workers’ councils, problems with worker protection laws 
and the share of low-skilled employees have no significant impact. 
Overall, the main determinants of exports are size and productivity. Financial 
constraints in the form of cash flow constraints have a significantly negative impact as 
well, and our results also show the importance of labor market constraints.  
4.3 The Extensive and Intensive Margin of FDI 
The Mills’ ratio is insignificant in the FDI equation. Also, the decision to invest 
abroad is not affected by being located in East Germany, but firms operating with 
outdated technology have a lower probability to invest abroad. 
Firm size has a significantly positive effect on the probability to engage in FDI as well 
as on the volume of investments; an increase in the size of the firms by one percent 
increases the volume of FDI nearly proportionally. Labor productivity has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on FDI, and the size of the effects is larger than the effect of 
firm size.  
Self-reported financial constraints have no impact on firms’ FDI activity. Cash flow 
has a weakly significant positive effect on the probability to invest abroad but not on 
the volume.  
Labor market constraints affect the selection into FDI activity but not the volume of 
activities. Wage cost problems and collective bargaining agreements have a negative 
effect on the decision to invest abroad, whereas personnel shortage has a positive 
impact on the probability to engage in FDI. Labor market constraints have no 
significant impact on the volume of FDI.    17
As regards the remaining control variables, lagged export intensity as a proxy for 
experience on foreign markets has a significantly positive effect on the selection into 
FDI activity, which declines with a rising export intensity. This variable has no effect 
on the volume of FDI. Firm-level R&D activity has a positive impact on the decision 
to invest abroad, but a mostly insignificant effect on the volume. The negative sign of 
firm age suggests that younger firms decide more often to invest abroad. The variable 
controlling for firm group status has a significant effect on the selection into FDI. 
Single-plant firms invest abroad less often. Again, we do not find an effect on the 
volume of FDI. 
In sum, productivity and size are the main drivers of FDI activity. Financial con-
straints do not seem to matter, but labor market constraints considerably affect the 
extensive margin of FDI. 
5 Conclusions 
There is a strong consensus in the theoretical and empirical literature that heterogene-
ity across firms with regard to productivity is a powerful explanation for the domi-
nance of large exporters and multinational firms. In this paper, we distinguish 
productivity, financial constraints, and labor market constraints as barriers to entry 
into foreign markets. We use a detailed and representative firm-level dataset for 
German firms which contains information on productivity, R&D, financial con-
straints, labor market constraints, as well as export and FDI activities. We use a 
Heckman selection model to analyze both the intensive and the extensive margin of 
international activity. Our main results are as follows. 
First, in line with the existing literature, larger and more productive firms as well as 
firms with more R&D activity are more likely to export and to engage in FDI than   18
smaller and less productive firms. Size and productivity affect both margins and are 
the main determinants of foreign activities at the firm level.  
Second, self-reported financial constraints have no impact on exports but firms with 
higher cash flow have higher export volumes. We did not find any relevant effect of 
financial variables on FDI activity.  
Third, labor market constraints have a significant impact on the decision to invest 
abroad and to export. Being covered by a collective bargaining scheme has a negative 
effect on foreign investment and exporting. Wage cost problems have significant but 
less robust effects as well. Domestic personnel shortages push firms into foreign 
activities. In general, labor market constraints affect the extensive margin more than 
the intensive margin of international activity.  
What do our results imply for policymakers who would like to promote the entry of 
smaller or mid-sized firms into foreign markets? Policies aimed at improving 
productivity and at promoting innovations certainly have a key role to play. Financial 
constraints, in contrast, do not play an important role. Perhaps the most interesting 
finding in this paper is the importance of labor market constraints. Institutional 
arrangements on labor markets and labor market conditions particularly affect the 
decision to invest abroad. Firms with wage cost problems and firms covered by 
collective bargaining have a lower probability to invest abroad, firms with personnel 
shortages and works councils have a higher probability. Results for exports are 
similar. At the same time, the prevalence of these problems increases in firm size. 
Potential policies aimed at promoting entry into foreign markets thus need to take 
complex interactions between firm size, labor market constraints, and foreign 
activities into account.   19
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Table A1: Data Definitions and Availability  
The empirical analysis in this paper is based on data taken from the IAB Establishment-Level Panel ( IAB Betriebspanel). (See 
http://betriebspanel.iab.de/infos.htm for details.) The IAB Establishment-Level Panel is a large panel dataset, which is representative for German firms. The panel 
is a survey of German firms with a special focus on labor market conditions. The survey has been conducted annually since 1993, and panel data are available for 
about 16,000 plants representative of all industries and size classes. 
Measured in  Referring to period   
Measurement 
2004 2005 2006 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Cash flow  Share of cash flow in investments    x        x     
Financial  constraints  Dummy variable reporting problems to raise external capital for 
investments (see section 3) 
 x      x    
Collective bargaining   Dummy variable reporting existence of collective bargaining in any 
modality 
x       x    
Expected personnel 
shortage 
Dummy variable reporting personnel shortage, Reasons: 1. Lack of 
employees, junior staff or skilled employees; 2. Demand for 
vocational training; 3. Brain drain  
x        x  x 
Expected problems with 
worker protection laws  
Dummy variable reporting problems with worker protection laws 
Reasons: 1. Maternity protection; 2. Partial retirement; 3. Part-time 
occupation  
x        x  x 
Expected wage cost 
problems  
Dummy variable reporting wage cost problems, Reasons: 1. 
Abundance of human resources; 2. Problems with wage costs 
x        x  x 
Export share  Share of foreign sales in total sales   x  x  x  (x)  x  x  x  (x) 
Innovation problems   Dummy variable reporting innovation problems   x      x  x  x     
Innovations   Dummy variable reporting whether innovations are implemented  x      x  x  x     
Level of technology  Discrete variable from 1 (best) to 5 (worst) (self-reported)    x  x        x  x 
Productivity  Labor productivity (value added / employment), Value added is sales 
less intermediate inputs  
x x x   
(x) 
x x x  (x) 
R&D   Dummy variable reporting existence of R&D activity  x          x     
Share of unskilled 
employees 
Number of unskilled employees divided by total employment   x  x  x      x  x  x 
Works council   Dummy variable reporting existence of a works council  x          x       22
Table A2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Observations  Mean / Share  Standard 
deviation 
International activities      
Share of exporting firms (2006)  12,141  10 %  0.30 % 
Export-to-sales ratio (2006)  12,141  2.8 %  12 % 
Share of FDI firms (2006)  12,051  0.5 %  0.07 % 
FDI volume (Euro) (2006)   239  623,840  2,792,411 
Export volume (Euro) (2006)  10,100  392,099  19,000,000 
Size and productivity      
Employees (number) (2006)  15,449  17  109 
Employees (number, full time equivalent ) (2006)  15,444  14  98 
Share of firms expecting  personnel shortage (2004)  10,923  19 %  0.39 % 
Share of firms expecting  innovation problems (2004)  10,923  8 %  0.27 % 
Share of innovative firms (2004)  10,923  28 %  0.45 % 
Labor productivity (value added / employment) (2006)  9,243  58,221  105,841 
Level of technology (1 best, 5 worst) (2005)  12,651  2.23  0.78 
Share of firms with R&D activity  (2004)  10,923  5 %  0.22 % 
Sales productivity (sales / employment) (2006)  10,191  131,453  222,031 
Value added (Euro) (2006)  9,244  889,959  11,439,708 
Financial constraints      
Share of cash flow used in investments (2005)  8,033  71 %  42 % 
Share of firms reporting financial constraints  7,645  8 %  0.27 % 
Labor market constraints      
Share of firms expecting problems with worker 
protection laws (2004) 
10,923  5 %  0.23 % 
Share of firms expecting wage cost problems (2004)  10,923  31 %  0.46 % 
Share of firms subject to industry-wide collective 
bargaining agreement (2004) 
10,899 39  %  0.487  % 
Share of skilled employees (2004)  10,923  6 %  0.17 % 
Share of unskilled employees (2004)  10,923  19 %  0.26 % 
Share of firms with works council (2004)  10,910  16 %  0.37 % 
Source: IAB Establishment-Level Panel, own calculations 
   23
Table 1: Share of Firms Subject to Financial and Labor Market Constraints  
Data are for the year 2004 and are given in percent of all firms. For reasons of data confidentiality, the 
agricultural and the financial sector as well as public services are not displayed. However, these industries are 
included in the regression analysis. 
(a) By size 


















1%  6% 12% 23% 24% 33% 
Expected wage 




27% 43% 51% 63% 68% 80% 
Share of credit 
constrained firms  10%  8%    9%      4%      6%      4% 
Works  council  7% 20% 50% 79% 90% 96% 
 














shortage  27% 20% 17% 23% 17% 17% 
Expected problems with 
worker protection laws  5% 1% 5% 4% 4% 7% 
Expected wage cost 
problems  40% 42% 29% 32% 26% 29% 
Industry-wide collective 
bargaining  45% 59% 37% 32% 15% 39% 
Share of credit 
constrained firms  11% 8%  10%  12% 9% 7% 
Works  council  24% 10% 15% 23% 13% 22% 
Source: IAB Establishment-Level Panel, own calculations   24
Table 2: Performance Indicators by Type of Firm 
(a) By Financial Constraints 
 Financial  constraints  (Self-reported) 
 Yes  No 
Share of exporting firms (%)  11  13 
Mean export volume (1,000 €)  342.5  704.1 
Export-to-sales ratio (%)  4  4 
Share of FDI-firms (%)  0.6  0.5 
Mean labor productivity (1,000 Euro)  42.7  63.3 
Mean sales (1,000 Euro)  2,058  3,514 
Mean number of employees  16  24 
Mean level of technological equipment (1 newest, 5 oldest)  2.3  2.1 
 









bargaining  Works council 
    Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No  Yes  No 
Share of exporting 
firms (%)  13 10 20 9 16 10 9 12  22  9
Mean export 
volume (1,000 €)  732.9 261.8 1,081.1 255.2 2,153.3 323.3 813.7 174.1  2,944.5  94.6
Export-to-sales 
ratio (%)  33  524323   6  3
Share of FDI firms 




54.4 63.1 60.5 60.1 62.8 60.0 66.4 56.2  84.3 57.0
Mean sales 
(1,000 Euro)  3,759 1,793 4,802 1,867 9,105 2,079 4,374 1,254 13,200 1,074
Mean number of 
employees  28 13 34 14 57 15 28 10  62  9
Mean level of 
technological 
equipment  
(1 newest, 5 
oldest) 
2.3 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.2  2.2 2.3
Source: IAB Establishment-Level Panel, own calculations   25
Table 3: Determinants of Exports – Heckman Selection Model 
This table gives results of the Heckman selection regression (two-step estimator) of the volume of export activity 
on various lagged regressors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the volume of exports (in Euro) 
in 2005. The variables innovations, innovative problems, outdated technology, and East Germany are excluded 
from the volume regression for identification. Robust z statistics in parenthesis. The constant is omitted in the 
table. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%-level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection 
Size and productivity          
Log productivity (t-1)  1.245*** 0.328*** 1.212*** 0.320*** 1.235*** 0.333*** 1.221*** 0.335*** 
  (19.93) (10.07) (18.29)  (8.11)  (19.53)  (9.92)  (18.04)  (8.22) 
Log employees (t-1)  1.147*** 0.259*** 1.127*** 0.237*** 1.142*** 0.277*** 1.145*** 0.246*** 
  (28.64) (14.80) (27.10) (11.00) (26.87) (12.93) (26.01)  (9.45) 
Financial constraints          
Self-reported financial constraints (t-1) (0/1)     -0.003  -0.044     0.016  -0.055 
     (0.02)  (0.42)    (0.12)  (0.52) 
Cash flow (share) (t-1)     0.003*** 0.001     0.003*** 0.001 
     (2.85)  (1.16)    (2.94)  (1.27) 
Labor market constraints          
Wage cost problems (t-1) (0/1)       -0.202***  -0.069  -0.186**  -0.095 
       (2.92)  (1.39)  (2.50)  (1.59) 
Personnel shortage (t-1) (0/1)       0.063  0.153***  0.035  0.143** 
       (0.88)  (2.89)  (0.47)  (2.33) 
Problems with worker protection laws (t-1) (0/1)       -0.041  -0.093  -0.019  -0.017 
       (0.39)  (1.07)  (0.18)  (0.17) 
Share of unskilled employees (t-1)       0.123  0.011  0.142  0.174 
       (0.81)  (0.11)  (0.85)  (1.38) 
Works council (t-1) (0/1)       0.120  0.089  0.051  0.112 
       (1.38)  (1.41)  (0.55)  (1.54) 
Collective bargaining (t-1) (0/1)       -0.116  -0.350***  -0.178**  -0.353*** 
       (1.36)  (6.32)  (1.96)  (5.42) 
Control variables          
R&D (t-1)  0.796*** 0.523*** 0.807*** 0.568*** 0.770*** 0.507*** 0.807*** 0.558*** 
  (7.78) (7.33) (7.27) (7.02) (7.65) (7.05) (7.33) (6.84) 
Foreign direct investment activity (0/1)  0.574*** 0.658*** 0.506*** 0.666*** 0.535*** 0.612*** 0.484*** 0.640*** 
  (4.34) (4.10) (3.92) (3.86) (4.12) (3.81) (3.78) (3.69) 
Firm founded before 1990 (0/1)  0.057 0.191*** 0.066  0.148**  0.038 0.153*** 0.038  0.112* 
  (0.79) (3.44) (0.86) (2.21) (0.51) (2.72) (0.47) (1.65) 
Establishment = firm (t-1) (0/1)  0.144 -0.017 0.140 -0.083 0.148 -0.006 0.137 -0.074 
  (1.42) (0.20) (1.33) (0.86) (1.46) (0.07) (1.31) (0.77) 
Selection:          
Innovations (t-1) (0/1)   0.333***  0.303***  0.321***  0.285*** 
   (6.42)  (4.86)  (6.12)  (4.52) 
Innovation problems (t-1) (0/1)   0.011  0.040  -0.001  0.024 
   (0.15)  (0.49)  (0.01)  (0.29) 
Outdated  technology   0.061*  0.069*  0.070**    0.080** 
   (1.92)  (1.79)  (2.19)  (2.04) 
East Germany  (0/1)   -0.305***  -0.239***  -0.345***  -0.244*** 
   (5.25)  (3.41)  (5.55)  (3.23) 
Mills’ ratio  0.666***  0.486**  0.618***  0.487**  
  (0.196)  (0.223)  (0.197)  (0.225)  
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  5,864 5,864 3,711 3,711 5,851 5,851 3,705 3,705 
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, own calculations   26
Table 4: Determinants of FDI – Heckman Selection Model 
This table gives the results of the Heckman selection regression (two-step estimator) of the volume of foreign 
direct investment activity on various lagged regressors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the 
volume of foreign direct investment (FDI) (in Euro) in 2004 and/or 2005. The variables innovations, innovative 
problems, outdated technology, and East Germany are excluded from the volume regression for identification. 
Robust z statistics in parenthesis. The constant is omitted in the table. *, **, *** significant at the 10%, 5%, 1%-
level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection Volume Selection 
Size and productivity          
Log productivity (t-1)  1.299*** 0.191*** 1.228*** 0.132  1.214*** 0.165**  1.187*** 0.114 
  (4.33) (2.67) (4.77) (1.58) (4.31) (2.20) (4.78) (1.31) 
Log employees (t-1)  0.852*** 0.056 0.848*** 0.074*  0.867*** 0.052 0.871*** 0.072 
  (6.12) (1.47) (5.94) (1.69) (5.79) (1.14) (5.56) (1.38) 
Financial constraints          
Self-reported financial constraints (t-1) (0/1)     0.237  0.289    0.396  0.280 
     (0.44)  (1.47)    (0.73)  (1.39) 
Cash flow (share) (t-1)     -0.001  0.003*    -0.001  0.003* 
     (0.31)  (1.67)    (0.28)  (1.79) 
Labor market constraints          
Wage cost problems (t-1) (0/1)           0.017 -0.215* 0.132  -0.143 
       (0.05)  (1.95)  (0.43)  (1.18) 
Personnel shortage (t-1) (0/1)           0.539 0.224** 0.418  0.216* 
       (1.43)  (2.06)  (1.20)  (1.82) 
Problems with worker protection laws (t-1) (0/1)          -0.374 0.104 -0.489 0.050 
       (0.97)  (0.71)  (1.28)  (0.31) 
Share of unskilled employees (t-1)          0.377 -0.168 0.371 -0.125 
       (0.46)  (0.67)  (0.45)  (0.44) 
Works council (t-1) (0/1)         0.119  0.259*  -0.083  0.182 
       (0.29)  (1.89)  (0.22)  (1.20) 
Collective bargaining (t-1) (0/1)        -0.531  -0.289**  -0.256  -0.217 
       (1.28)  (2.36)  (0.70)  (1.62) 
Control variables          
R&D (t-1)   1.850**  0.750*** 1.500* 0.780*** 1.481* 0.742***  1.327  0.765*** 
  (2.02) (5.31) (1.78) (4.89) (1.66) (5.15) (1.61) (4.73) 
Export share of sales (t-1)   0.042 0.039*** 0.034 0.039*** 0.032 0.038*** 0.029 0.037*** 
  (1.04) (5.94) (0.96) (5.31) (0.81) (5.72) (0.82) (5.10) 
Export share of sales (squared) (t-1)   -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000***
  (0.84) (4.39) (0.68) (4.09) (0.62) (4.25) (0.56) (3.93) 
Firm founded before 1990 (0/1)  -0.833 -0.292** -0.922 -0.398** -0.832 -0.321** -0.983 -0.417** 
  (1.62) (2.14) (1.57) (2.47) (1.48) (2.30) (1.58) (2.55) 
Establishment = firm (t-1) (0/1)  -0.998 -0.748*** -0.846 -0.769*** -0.942 -0.748*** -0.880 -0.765***
  (1.29) (6.17) (1.22) (5.81) (1.23) (6.07) (1.27) (5.72) 
Selection:          
Innovations (t-1) (0/1)    -0.038  0.004  -0.060  -0.002 
   (0.28)  (0.03)  (0.43)  (0.01) 
Innovation problems (t-1) (0/1)    0.059  0.041  0.046  0.034 
   (0.44)  (0.28)  (0.34)  (0.23) 
Outdated technology   -0.210***  -0.253***  -0.208***  -0.255***
   (2.92)  (3.05)  (2.82)  (3.01) 
East Germany (0/1)   -0.072  -0.157  -0.125  -0.196 
   (0.49)  (0.92)  (0.81)  (1.08) 
Mills’ ratio  1.99   1.615  1.799  1.549  
  (1.290)  (1.121)  (1.311)  (1.134)  
Industry dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations  6,251 6,251 3,872 3,872 6,237 6,237 3,865 3,865 
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